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RUSTY PIPES: THE RUST DECISION AND THE




The Supreme Court long ago abandoned the early
approach to First Amendment questions that focused solely
upon the asserted rights of the speaker. Over the years, the
Court has defined a variety of other critical interests at stake in
disputes over freedom of expression. Taken together, these
interests, so the argument runs, obligate the government to
safeguard what is termed the "free flow of information." While
there have been occasional obstructions in the free flow pipe-
line permitted by the Court's rulings since the late 1970s, noth-
ing compares to the serious threat to the flow of information
like the ruling in Rust v. Sullivan rendered during the Court's
October 1990 Term.'
Although most observers understandably see the Rust rul-
ing as an abortion decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for a 5-4 majority in that case has profound implications for the
concept of free flow and the principles of freedom of speech
from which it was constructed. This article considers those ele-
ments of free flow, the significance of the free flow doctrine as a
whole, the argument of the Rust opinion, and the implications
that case presents for the idea that the First Amendment pro-
tects more than words, that it safeguards communication as an
enterprise.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF FREE FLOW THEORY
There is no doubt that many of the early free speech
debates focused on protection for speakers, often those who
sought to communicate unpopular, even hated ideas. Thus,
those studying the history of free speech encounter the debate
over whether Mr. Schenck went too far in sending his anti-war
message to draftees, whether Eugene Deb's speech on World
* B.A., California State University, Sacramento; M.A., Ph.D., Syracuse
University. Professor of Public Administration, University of Kansas.
1. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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War I exceeded permissible limits, or whether Abrams and his
colleagues moved beyond the protections of free speech in
tossing leaflets off the roof of a New York building protesting
U.S. involvement in Russian efforts to put down the revolu-
tion. However, a variety of factors moved the Supreme Court
away from the speakers' rights theory and toward an emphasis
on free flow of information. These pivotal issues include the
problem of the receivers' (or listeners') interests, the impor-
tance of protection for the message sent regardless of its
source, the stock of information issue, and the importance of
maintaining the integrity of communications processes quite
apart from any particular message.
A. The Development of Free Flow Theory
There is nothing new in the idea that freedom of speech
does more than simply protect a speaker. Indeed, Milton's
classic defense of freedom of expression in 1644 declared that
though all the windes of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously
by licensing and prohibiting to miscount her strength.
Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put
to the wors in a free and open encounter.
3
This is the origin of the marketplace of ideas concept, popular-
ized by Holmes and Brandeis, which holds that the true test of
an idea is its ability to get itself accepted in the marketplace of
ideas.4
Alexander Meiklejohn wrote in criticizing early First
Amendment opinions, however, that there was too much
emphasis on speech as the right of an individual and not
enough about the constitutional importance of communication;
too much concern for an individualist definition and too little
awareness of the social purpose of the First Amendment. For
him, free speech was a means to the end of self-government
rather than an end in itself.5 The message and the importance
of the availability of information to those who might want to
2. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. 2 COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OFJOHN MILTON 560 (D. Bush et al. eds.,
1959).
4. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
5. "The principle of freedom of speech springs from the necessities of
the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the
abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public
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hear it were far more important than the claimed rights of the
speaker. He insisted, "Now, in the method of political self-
government, the point of ultimate interest is not the words of
the speakers, but the minds of the hearers ... [w]hat is essen-
tial is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said."'
If the point of freedom of speech is to protect the discus-
sion and not simply the speaker, and that process is essential to
self-government, then government may have an obligation to
go beyond merely protecting speech from interference or cen-
sorship. It may have an affirmative obligation to facilitate com-
munication in all its aspects. That is the argument made by
Thomas I. Emerson, who maintained that government must
"undertake positively to promote and encourage freedom of
expression, as by furnishing facilities, eliminating distortions in
the media of communication, or making information
available." 7
By the late 1960s, the communications revolution of the
late twentieth century was well underway. The Court was
repeatedly confronted by the fact that free speech meant far
more than taking to the soapbox. First Amendment opinions
increasingly referred to other aspects of the communication
process and to the idea that there is a protection for the free
flow of information. The Court upheld the right of adults to
possess obscene matter for their own use in the privacy of their
homes on grounds that the "right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth ... is fundamental to our
free society."' The Court warned elsewhere against efforts "to
control the flow of ideas to the public."9 The Court also
admonished the government to promote "the paramount inter-
est in a free flow of information to the people."' °
B. The Effort to Craft a Standard
Three sets of cases moved the free flow discussion along to
the point where the Court was willing to use the term as a cen-
tral concept in its rulings. First, there was the growing body of
broadcasting cases from the late 1960s through the 1970s and
issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1960).
6. Id. at 26.
7. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 4
(1970); see also JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977).
8. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
9. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306 (1965).
10. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
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into the 1980s. At the core of many of the television cases,
starting with the challenge to the fairness doctrine in Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC," was the discussion about whether the
broadcasters' rights were the sole focus of concern in such
cases, or whether the focus was actually a debate about the rela-
tionship among the asserted rights of the license holder, the
needs of the public for information, and the concerns of the
government as regulator attempting to safeguard the public
interest. The Court concluded:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount.... It is the pur-
pose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail, rather than to countenance monopolization of the
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a pri-
vate licensee. 1'
2
The primary value, according to the Court, was the "right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas . ,,is While there have been differ-
ences of opinion within the Court as to just how important the
rights of broadcast licensees are relative to those of the viewers
or listeners, 4 and how different broadcast journalism is from
print, 5 the Court has clearly recognized that there are many
facets to modern free speech that play simultaneous roles in
what we call the communication process.
While the discussion over the role of broadcasting in free-
dom of speech was developing, there emerged an expanded
freedom of speech and press debate concerning not only
claimed censorship of publication, but also efforts to obtain
protection for the right to acquire and edit information as well.
In striking down across-the-board controls on prisoner mail,
the Court rejected the claim that the central issue was the right
of the inmates to express themselves. Instead, the Court
focused upon the right of the addressee to receive the letters
and the need to protect the process of communication. "Com-
munication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing
words on paper. Rather, it is affected only when the letter is
11. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
12. Id. at 390.
13. Id.; see also William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right to Receive
Expression, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 303, 303.
14. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984);
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973).
15. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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read by the addressee."' 6 By the mid-1970s, the Court had
made clear that it was concerned with the right to send, the
right to receive, and the process of communication. The Court
also recognized a need to be free to acquire information,
though it rejected the idea that the First Amendment is a free-
dom of information act. In a host of cases, the Court debated
the questions of where and under what circumstances a
reporter or an ordinary citizen could claim access to places like
prisons, records, or channels of communication.' 7 In these
cases, the Court has upheld rights of access in a number of set-
tings, including judicial proceedings.'
8
Finally, there was the body of case law that blended the
developing commercial free speech debate with the effort to
address regulation of campaign expenditures. The Court's
determination in Buckley v. Valeo, 9 that the expenditure of
money for the advancement of political candidates or ideas is,
under many conditions, protected by the First Amendment,
brought a revolution in campaign financing. The Buckley line of
cases, coupled with the so-called commercial free speech cases,
expanded both the concept of free flow of information and the
range of issues to be debated when considering the limits of
the free flow idea.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consum-
ers Council,2" the Supreme Court ruled that the fact that a
message was cominunicated by a profit-making organization
with the intention of making money did not remove the speech
from First Amendment protection. In coming to this conclu-
sion, the Court observed that for the consumer, particularly
some of the elderly consumers in the case, interest in commer-
cial information such as pharmaceutical prices "may be keen, if
not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate."'" Neither the source of the information nor
the fact that it was commercial rather than political undermined
its value under the First Amendment. Justice Blackmun, writ-
ing for the Court in Virginia State Board, stressed the breadth of
free speech protections. "Freedom of speech presupposes a
16. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974).
17. Anthony Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The
First Amendment as Sword, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
18. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984);
Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
19. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21. Id. at 763.
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willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here,
the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source
and to its recipients both."22 Quite apart from the particular
interests of the speaker and listener, said the Court, the society
has "a strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information."2"
There was an argument that advertising was different from
other forms of speech and that the information that the speak-
ers sought to convey and the listeners to receive was available
elsewhere. Therefore it was unnecessary to protect the adver-
tisement. But the Court answered:
We are aware of no general principle that freedom of
speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners
could come by his message by some other means, such as
seeking him out and asking him what it is. Nor have we
recognized any such limitation on the independent right
of the listener to receive the information sought to be
communicated.24
The right to spend money to advance political views and
the inclusion of profit-making institutions in that protection
came together in First National Bank v. Bellotti,2 5 where the
Court struck down a Massachusetts restriction on corporate
expenditures in referendum campaigns. Justice Powell insisted
that it was unnecessary for the Court to concern itself with
whether the Bank had a First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.26 "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual."-27 The Court concluded:
[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the
press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw. A commercial
advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much
because it pertains to the seller's business as because it
furthers the societal interest in the "free flow of commer-
cial information. "28
22. Id. at 756.
23. Id. at 764.
24. Id. at 757 n.15.
25. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
26. Id. at 775-76.
27. Id. at 777.
28. Id. at 783. The commercial speech and campaign expenditure cases
have been controversial from a variety of perspectives, including the threats
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In two opinions striking public utilities regulations, the
Court warned that content-based prohibitions are unaccept-
able 29 and stressed the distinction between the prohibition of
communication and acceptable time, place, and manner regula-
tion." Citing two earlier rulings, the Court observed:
" '[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and ... the best means to that end is to
open the channels of communication, rather than to close
them.' . . . [T]he First Amendment presumes that some accu-
rate information is better than no information at all."
'3 '
These rulings, taken together, present a free flow theory of
the First Amendment which goes well beyond the speaker's
rights and beyond merely adding listeners' interests to the
claims of the speaker. The free flow theory provides that: lis-
teners' rights to receive information are protected like the
rights of the speaker; the protection of the message is as signifi-
cant as the claims of the speaker; government may not inhibit
the process of communication, including the ability to send as
well as the ability to obtain information; and government may
not attempt to limit the stock of information available in the
marketplace of ideas.
posed to the democratic process. See id. at 802 (White, Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
29. In Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980), the Court warned
The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation
extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. As a general
matter, "the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
[408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)].... In Mosley, we held that a municipality
could not exempt labor picketing from a general prohibition on
picketing at a school even though the ban would have reached both
pro- and anti-union demonstrations. If the marketplace of ideas is
to remain free and open, governments must not be allowed to
choose "which issues are worth discussing or debating." . . . To
allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public
debate would be to allow that government control over the search
for political truth.
Id. at 537-38.
30. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
31. Id. at 562; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977);
Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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III. THE RUST CASE AND ITS INTERNATIONAL COUNTERPART
There is no doubt that there have been departures in par-
ticular cases from the Court's announced free flow theory.3"
However, the Rust opinion seems to deliver a serious blow to
the fundamental concept of First Amendment protection for
the free flow of information. In order to comprehend the free
speech implications of Rust, it is important to consider the
development of the case in the circuits and its treatment in the
Supreme Court.
A. Title X Regulations in the Circuit Courts
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rust v. Sullivan to
resolve a conflict among the First, Second, and Tenth Circuits
over their assessment of regulations issued in 1988 by the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services governing federally
funded family planning operations, the so-called Title X pro-
grams.33 The 1988 regulations represented a major change
from the federal rules that had been in place for years prior.
In 1970, Congress passed Title X of the Public Health
Services Act, entitled the Family Planning and Services Popula-
tion Research Act of 1970."4 The Court's announcement of a
right to terminate pregnancies in 1973 fueled the debate over
the availability of abortions for poor women.3 5
Two sets of cases testing the boundaries of abortion fund-
ing restrictions came to the Court during the 1970s. The first
produced opinions upholding restrictions for so-called "non-
therapeutic abortions. '"36 The second set upheld restrictions
imposed by the Hyde Amendment even where the abortions
sought were therapeutic rather than elective, meaning that the
woman's life or health was in question if she carried the preg-
nancy to term.
3 7
Title X family planning funding also carried a restriction
on abortion funding which read: "none of the funds appropri-
ated under [Title X] shall be used in programs where abortion
32. I have discussed a number of these cases elsewhere. See Phillip J.
Cooper, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Freedom of Information, 46
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 622 (1986).
33. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
2559 (1990).
34. Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a
(1989)).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
37. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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is a method of family planning.""8 From its 1981 guidelines to
1988, the Department of Health and Human Services inter-
preted the statutory restriction to mean that the funds could
not be used to finance abortions but permitted nondirective
counselling under which family planning programs could pro-
vide information regarding abortion along with other material
distributed to their clients.
In early 1988, HHS issued new regulations with a much
more restrictive interpretation of the statute. Family planning
services were restricted to "preconception" services only, a
somewhat ironic action in light of the fact that the most com-
mon point of intake for such programs is pregnancy testing.
The revision also included a restriction that precluded the
grant recipients from using their funds to provide nondirective
counselling regarding abortion, although programs were
required to provide "a list of available providers that promote
the welfare of mother and unborn child."
39
Information regarding abortion or abortion providers
could not be provided even if the patient specifically asked for
it. In such a case, the counsellor was to inform the patient that
the program did not regard abortion as an appropriate aspect
of family planning. Moreover, the revised regulations prohibit
not only the use of federal funds, but of virtually any other
funds by the program to provide abortion related services.
Those regulations required that a funded program and any
affiliated organization that was involved in pro-abortion activi-
ties, including lobbying or the provision of speakers on abor-
tion topics, be "physically and financially" separate.
Challenges were immediately launched to the facial valid-
ity of the regulations in a number of courts, seeking injunctions
against their implementation. The District Court for Massa-
chusetts promptly barred the HHS action.4" The First Circuit
affirmed the district court conclusion that the regulations were
unconstitutional and found one of the regulations in violation
of the statute.4' The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclu-
sion a few months later, expressing explicit agreement with the
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988).
39. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1990).
40. Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1988).
41. Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990).
The First Circuit sat en banc because there was some question whether the
Supreme Court's ruling in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (1989), required reconsideration of an earlier panel decision in the case.
1992]
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First Circuit in the process. 42 However, the Second Circuit
upheld the regulations.4 3
Three arguments were made in the lower courts. First, the
1988 regulations were challenged as violative of the intent of
the Family Planning Act on grounds that the agency had given
far too narrow a reading to the statute. Although the statutory
language and the legislative history were ambiguous, the chal-
lengers rejected the claim that the courts should defer to HHS
under the Chevron doctrine,44 and cited instead the Supreme
Court's ruling in the Airbags case.45 Since the Secretary had
operated under the much more permissive rules since 1981,
the change, they urged, represented the kind of substantial
departure from a settled agency interpretation that required,
under the Airbags ruling, a reasoned explanation, certainly far
more of a reasoned explanation than had been offered by HHS
in 1988. In the absence of such a justification, the change
should be regarded as arbitrary and capricious.
Second, opponents argued that the regulations were in
violation of the First Amendment freedom of speech because
they interfered with the communication between a doctor and
patient or between a counsellor and client.
Finally, the challengers argued that the regulations were in
violation of a woman's constitutional right to choose to termi-
nate her pregnancy under Roe v. Wade because the restrictions
on information and services to the patients placed an unaccept-
able burden on the woman's ability to make an informed deci-
sion. Citing the Supreme Court's opinions in City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health46 and Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,47 Planned Parenthood
and the other plaintiffs argued that, ever since Doe v. Bolton,48
which was issued along with Roe v. Wade in 1973, the Court had
consistently rejected government actions that interfered with
the consultation between the woman and her physician in dis-
cussions concerning whether to terminate a pregnancy.
42. Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir.
1990), aff'g 687 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1988).
43. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989).
44. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,
494 U.S. 775 (1990).
45. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
This case deals with the mandate for passive restraint devices, or airbags, in
federal regulations, and is commonly referred to as the Airbags case.
46. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
47. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
48. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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The lower courts agreed that neither the language of the
act nor the legislative history was sufficiently clear to resolve
the statutory claims. Despite the fact that both the First and
Tenth Circuits thought the Secretary's "reasoned analysis" in
support of the changed regulations was "weak," neither could,
consistent with their view of the requirements for judicial def-
erence under Chevron and NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific,
4 9
reject the administrative construction of the statute. 50 Even so,
both circuits found that Section 59.9 concerning the "physical
and financial separation" requirement simply went too far and
violated legislative intent.
Neither the First nor the Tenth Circuit found any ambigu-
ity with respect to the constitutional issues. Both began by
rejecting the government's contention that these regulations
were nothing more than an extension of the line of cases,
beginning with Maher v. Roe5 and including the Webster ruling,
which held that government was free in its policies to prefer
childbirth over abortion. Although they accepted the general
authority of the government to prefer childbirth and to refuse
to fund abortion, the two circuits did not grant the proposition
that therefore any policy favoring childbirth over abortion was
acceptable.
The First Circuit began from the proposition that the deci-
sion to terminate a pregnancy is protected by Roe v. Wade. The
dialogue between physician and patient is also protected
according to Akron 52 and Thornburgh.55
The Supreme Court in Akron, inter alia, struck a require-
ment that a physician provide a specific message to the patient.
The First Circuit cited the Supreme Court conclusion in that
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
50. The First Circuit concluded:
Our examination of the traditional elements of statutory
construction yields the following results. The plain words of the
statute are susceptible to differing interpretations. The
contemporaneous legislative history is inconclusive, except on the
issue of program coordination. The subsequent legislative history
indicates congressional acquiescence to the previous agency policy
promoting nondirective counselling, but this acquiescence does not
preclude a change in agency policy. And, finally, because of the
deference due an agency's interpretation of an enabling statute, the
Secretary's new policy is not impermissible under the statute.
Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 1990).
51. See supra note 36.
52. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 442-
47 (1983).
53. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763-65 (1986).
1992]
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case that: "It is fair to say that much of the information
required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but
rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether." 4 Addition-
ally, the Akron Court had concluded, the law unduly restricted a
physician from providing the best medical advice. The Court
said in Akron that "it remains primarily the responsibility of the
physician to ensure that appropriate information is conveyed to
his patient, depending on her particular circumstances." 5 5 The
First Circuit relied upon the Akron opinion's conclusion that:
"By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible list of
information, Akron unreasonably has placed 'obstacles in the
path of the doctor upon whom [the woman] is entitled to rely
for advice in connection with her decision.' "56
The two circuits noted that Thornburgh had been based
upon Akron and went beyond it in warning that government
could not use forced information delivered by doctors to
coerce a patient not to have an abortion. The First Circuit
cited Thornburgh's warning that "the State may not require the
delivery of information designed 'to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or childbirth.' 57 Judge
Bownes quoted at length the Supreme Court's admonition
from Thornburgh that the Constitution recognized the place of
the physician in this decision process and the need for
independence.
Even the listing of agencies . . . presents serious
problems; it contains names of agencies that well may be
out of step with the needs of the particular woman and
this places the physician in an awkward position and
infringes upon his or her professional responsibilities.
Forcing the physician or counselor to present the materi-
als and the list to the woman makes him or her in effect
an agency of the State in treating the woman and places
his or her imprimatur upon both the materials and the
list. . . . All this is, or comes close to being, state
medicine imposed upon the woman, not the professional
medical guidance she seeks, and it officially structures-
as it obviously was intended to do-the dialogue between
the woman and her physician.5"
54. Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
55. Id. at 443.
56. Id. at 445.
57. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760.
58. Id. at 762-63. The First Circuit recalled its own decision in Planned
Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981). In
that case, the court struck down a waiting period requirement because it
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Given the direct interference in the physician's ability to
answer specific questions posed by patients and the admoni-
tions of Akron and Thornburgh, the First Circuit concluded:
"The effect of the new regulations is to infringe upon women's
freedom of reproductive choice by denying them access to
important information and by interfering with the physician-
patient relationship.'"
There was no doubt that there was an interference in free
communications. Therefore, according to the First Circuit, the
questions were whether there was something about these com-
munications that kept them outside the protection of the First
Amendment, or, if they were covered, was there some adequate
justification for the abridgement of free expression.
As to the former, the court rejected.the argument that gov-
ernment could carve out a class of communications and simply
treat it as non-First Amendment speech because it involved
grant recipients in the family planning program. Such an argu-
ment could not be made unless one were prepared to overturn
a long line of decisions providing that one cannot be made to
accept unconstitutional conditions as the price of a government
grant or job.6 ° The Circuit Court cited the frequently quoted
passage from Perry v. Sindermann:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear
that even though a person has no "right" to a valuable
government benefit and even though the government
may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons,
there are some reasons upon which the government may
not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interest-
especially his interest in freedom of speech. For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of
his constitutionally protected speech .... his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited.6'
The First Circuit relied upon FCC v. League of Women Vot-
ers to apply the basic law of substantive restriction upon
added an unjustified burden on the woman's decision. That statute might
also have fallen for reasons similar to the present case except that it allowed
the physician and patient considerably more freedom to go beyond the
required information.
59. Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 1990).
60. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963).
61. Secretay of HHS, 899 F.2d at 72-73 (quoting Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
62. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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expression and concluded that the reasons for protecting the
speech in the present case are even greater than in League of
Women Voters and that the claimed governmental interest was
even less substantial, certainly not rising to the level of any-
thing approaching a compelling justification.
The Tenth Circuit, like the First, refused to accept the gov-
ernment's contention that these regulations were but an exten-
sion of the line of cases decided in the 1970s and 1980s
holding that government may use its funding decisions to favor
childbirth over abortion.
Had the regulations directed that once pregnancy is
established the clinic must say, "Go away, we only give
advice on prepregnancy planning," then it might be said
the government has done no more than subsidize a per-
missible activity. The regulations, however, require the
clinic to go one step further in its treatment of the
patient. When a patient is diagnosed as pregnant she
must be provided with both referrals to prenatal service
providers and with interim information on prenatal care.
42 C.F.R. Section 59.8(a)(2). Even if the patient specifi-
cally requests information on abortion, the clinic is not
permitted to advise her about it.6"
Citing Harris v. McRae, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
regulations placed "a state created obstacle in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice."'  Like the First
Circuit, the Tenth Circuit panel found that case plainly fit
Thornburgh and Akron.
In its treatment of the First Amendment issue, the Tenth
Circuit focused upon the rights and responsibilities of the doc-
tor as well as those of the patient. "Although the matter has
received little separate attention in court opinions to this point,
the limitations placed on Title X physicians in communicating
with their patients, and referral obligations imposed upon
them, violate the constitutional rights of the physicians them-
selves. The dearth of attention may be because the physicians'




The court argued that the decision on what to tell a patient
is governed by professional norms which place the physician in
an impossible position in light of the prohibitions presented in
63. Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1499-500 (10th
Cir. 1990).
64. Id. at 1501.
65. Id. at 1503.
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the Title X regulations. "The canons of ethics of the medical
profession require a physician to give patients advice that
includes abortion as an alternative to carrying a pregnancy to
term when the patient's health condition warrants."66 In a
footnote, the court cited several professional codes outlining
the obligation of a physician to provide the patient with com-
plete information, including the abortion option.67 Presuma-
bly, the Court said, failure to honor those professional conduct
codes because of the HHS regulations could result in profes-
sional sanctions against the clinicians.6" From all of that the
court determined that: "To condition receipt of Title X funds
upon physicians' promise not to give advice that the standards
of their profession require them to give implicates the physi-
cians' First and Fifth Amendment rights."69
Turning to the patient's First Amendment interests, the
Tenth Circuit took on the government's argument that the
information was available from alternative sources in a lengthy
footnote in which it suggested that because there has been so
much legal activity concerning the availability of abortion in
many states, women were particularly in need of additional
information and there was little evidence that it was otherwise
available.
One reason women might seek information about their
medical options at a family planning clinic is the confu-
sion that arises from the barrage of bills introduced,
passed, vetoed, or stayed by judicial action.... The two
decisions issued at the end of the most recent Supreme
Court term, Hodgson v. Minnesota . . . and Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health... (upholding parental noti-
66. Id.
67. The court cited:
Current Opin. of Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association-1986, [at] 807 ("physician has an ethical
obligation to help the patient make choices from among the
therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice");
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (ACOG),
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 57 (1985) (in event of
unwanted pregnancy the physician should counsel patient of
abortion option); ACOG, Statement of Policy: Further Ethical
Considerations in Induced Abortion (Dec. 1977) ("Counseling directed
solely toward either promoting or preventing abortion does not
sufficiently reflect the full nature of the problem or the range of
options to which the patient is entitled.").
Id. at 1503 n.5.
68. Id. at 1504.
69. Id.
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fication statutes), are unlikely to reduce the legislative
activity or women's confusion about their medical
options.
7 °
Judge Baldock dissented, in part, accepting the argument
that the rules were an extension of the Maher line of cases.
Still, he recognized that: "The regulations, however, undoubt-
edly infringe upon the doctor-patient relationship by limiting
the free flow of information from the doctor to the patient
regarding abortion services."' 7 ' Even so, he concluded, "[T]he
Constitution provides little protection for the 'dialogue' a phy-
sician undertakes in the course of treating a patient. .. . Regu-
lation of the professions is a matter within the competence of
lawmakers, not federal courts."
72
The Second Circuit issued its opinion upholding the regu-
lations before either of the other circuits acted. The court
accepted the contention that the HHS regulations were an
extension of the cases permitting government preference in
favor of childbirth over abortion. It rejected the unconstitu-
tional conditions argument on grounds that counsellors and
others "remain free to say whatever they wish about abortion
outside the Title X project.",73 Finally, to the degree that the
regulations limited expression regarding abortion, they con-
strained it on both the pro- and anti-abortion sides of the issue.
Judge Kearse, who issued a strong dissent quoted at length
in both the First and Tenth Circuit opinions, found:
It is naive to assert that not talking about abortion to a
pregnant woman when discussing her options is value-
neutral. In addition, the regulations are not even facially
neutral because they allow postconceptional counseling
in the best interests of the unborn child but not regard-
ing abortion. By discussing only what is best for the
unborn child, the counselor has already made the
70. Id. at 1501 n.3 (footnotes omitted). Even so, the Circuit opinion
observes in the next note that "The Supreme Court's recent Ohio opinion,
while approving a state requirement that a physician inform one parent when
a minor patient is considering abortion, continues to recognize the
importance of the advice of a detached physician with full information." Id.
at 1502 n.4.
71. Id. at 1505 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). He goes on
to note that "A physician certainly has a common law duty to discuss matters
openly and frankly with the patient. See Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513
A.2d 341, 355 (1986) (Souter, J., concurring)." Id.
72. Id.
73. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 412 (2d Cir. 1989).
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woman's choice. The Government, in restricting the
counselor's options to that choice, enforces its choice. 4
Indeed, Kearse found the regulations pervasively biased
against abortion. A woman, Kearse observed, "cannot make an
informed choice between two options when she cannot obtain
information as to one of them."
7 5
A Second Circuit panel, citing arguments and authorities
similar to the Title X case, rejected a challenge to an Agency
for International Development (AID) regulation that precluded
grant recipients from engaging in abortion related activities.7 6
The "Standard Provision to be Used in Grants and Cooperative
Agreements with U.S. Nongovernmental Organizations" holds
that foreign nongovernmental organizations receiving AID
funds must
certiqly] in writing that it does not perform or actively
promote abortion as a method of family planning in AID-
recipient countries and does not provide financial sup-
port to any other foreign nongovernmental organization
that conducts such activities.
7 7
As the court indicated, the phrase "actively promote"
is defined in the Standard Clause to include "providing
advice and information regarding the benefits and availa-
bility of abortion," "encouraging women to consider
abortion," and "[llobbying a foreign government to
legalize or make available abortion." . . . These restric-
tions on abortion-related activities apply to the entire
organization, not just to the project or division of the for-
eign NGO receiving AID funds.
7 8
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the AID case two
weeks after rendering its ruling on the Title X regulations.7 9
IV. RUST IN THE SUPREME COURT
Like a number of his other opinions, it is perhaps more
fitting to read Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument for the bare
majority more like a brief than as a majority opinion. But as an
opinion for the Court, it contains a variety of comments that
74. Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 72 (1st Cir. 1990).
75. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 416-17.
76. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev.,
915 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 61.
78. Id.
79. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev.,
915 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2257 (1991).
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will be cited for propositions quite apart from debates over the
right to an abortion. Rehnquist, like Chief Justice Stone long
before him, buries propositions in his opinions "like squirrels
store nuts to be unearthed at a later time when necessary."" °
In Rust, Rehnquist both pulled nuggets from opinions of the
past and stored others away for the future.
A. Setting the Stage for the Constitutional Debate
The Court's discussion of the fact pattern suggests early
on the character and approach of the argument. The discus-
sion begins by flatly stating that the Section 300a-6 restriction
on "abortion as a method of family planning" was "intended to
ensure that Title X funds would 'be used only to support pre-
ventive family planning services, population research, infertility
services, and other related medical, information, and educa-
tional activities.' "8 Even though all the courts that considered
the matter found the statutory language too ambiguous to be
useful, the Court presents this proposition as a clear premise.
Next, Rehnquist jumps immediately to the 1988 amendments
without discussion of the longstanding prior regulations.82
His discussion of the specific mandates of these regula-
tions at the outset of the case is troublesome in part because he
makes no reference to their significant alteration from the prior
version. Only later does he recognize that point, though it was
at all stages central to the case. He noted that 59.8(a)(1) pro-
vides that a "Title X project may not provide counseling con-
cerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or
provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning."
He went on to editorialize that "Because Title X is limited to
preconceptional services, the program does not furnish serv-
ices related to childbirth. Only in the context of a referral out
of the Title X program is a pregnant woman given transitional
information. '"8" The problem is that he assumes as a premise
that the statute intended to provide only preconception serv-
ices and ignores the long standing practice of providing post-
conception counseling. Rehnquist also referred to the 59.10(a)
restriction that bars any actions that "encourage, promote or
advocate abortion as a method of family planning." Again, he
presented the interpretation that included such a wide ranging
80. See ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW
(1956).
81. Rust, III S. Ct. at 1764-65.
82. See id.at 1765.
83. Id.
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set of activities that burden pro-choice groups as though that
had been the statutory purpose or longstanding administrative
practice. Finally, he referred to the 59.9 requirement that
"Title X projects be organized so that they are 'physically and
financially separate' from prohibited abortion activities."
Again, this is presented as though the agency were writing on a
clean slate. In some sense, his approach is understandable in
light his lack of regard for the ongoing administrative practice
doctrine set forth in his partial dissent in the Airbags case.
Although the Court announced at the outset its intention
to decide the case in order to resolve a conflict among the cir-
cuits, it ignored the other two opinions and addressed only the
Second Circuit contentions without reference to Judge
Kearse's dissent.
Having previously implied that the purpose of the statute
was clear, Rehnquist altered course considerably in his discus-
sion of the statutory challenges to the HHS regulations. He
agreed that the statute was ambiguous in language and in legis-
lative history.84 He provided three answers to the statutory
arguments. First, he contended that Chevron required defer-
ence to the agency. Second, he rejected the longstanding
administrative practice argument. Third, even if one applied
the Airbags requirement that the Secretary supply a "reasoned
analysis" in support of a policy change, the regulations passed
muster, according to the Court.
Rehnquist's reading of the Chevron deference doctrine is
extremely broad, an interpretation rejected by Justice Stevens
in his Rust dissent. Stevens was the original author of the Chev-
ron opinion (in which Rehnquist did not participate)." Citing
the deference language from Chevron,86 Rehnquist observed
84. Id. at 1767-68.
85. Id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. If a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
The Secretary's construction of Title Xmay not be disturbed as an abuse
of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the
statute and does not otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent. See
id. In determining whether a construction is permissible, "[t]he court need
not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it could
permissibly have adopted . ..or even the reading the court would have
reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at
843 n. 11. Rather, substantial deference is accorded to the interpretation of
the authorizing statute by the agency authorized with administering it. Id. at
844. See also Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767.
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that the language of the Act was so broad that the Court was
"unable to say that the Secretary's construction of the prohibi-
tion in [Section] 1008 to require a ban on counseling, referral,
and advocacy within the Title X project, is impermissible.""s
A number of problems are apparent. At the outset, it
somehow passed Rehnquist's notice that a statute as broad and
ambiguous as he assumes this one to be presents obvious diffi-
culties where it implicates First Amendment issues since it is
hornbook law that even permissible statutes which affect free-
dom of speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve constitu-
tionally acceptable ends.
Second, there is, in the majority opinion, a willing aban-
donment of the task of statutory interpretation to an agency
where the agency's interpretation may be plainly abusive
unless, as is rarely true, the legislature includes specific prohib-
itory language in a statute. There is a significant difference
between beginning with a presumption of validity and barring
inquiry unless there is a plainly expressed prohibition in the
legislation. That is especially true where fundamental rights
protected by the First Amendment are at issue. Rehnquist
observed that: "When we find, as we do here, that the legisla-
tive history is ambiguous and unenlightening on the matters
with respect to which the regulations deal, we customarily defer
to the expertise of the agency." 8 The short answer should be,
"but not where the First Amendment is involved."
Further, it is one thing to employ a broad doctrine of def-
erence where the administrative action in question rests upon
technical expertise and administrative experience, and quite
another where, as Justice Stevens pointed out in the Rust dis-
sent, the regulations "represented an assumption of policymak-
ing responsibility that Congress had not delegated to the
Secretary." 89 This distinction is all the more true when the
new interpretation was not contemporaneous with enactment
of the statute and flew in the face of longstanding administra-
tive practice.90 Reference to the truism in the Airbags ruling
that agencies are "not required to 'establish rules of conduct to
last forever,' "91 is hardly adequate to justify abandonment of
the traditional responsibility of courts to interpret statutes.
87. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1768.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
91. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769.
THE RUST DECISION
The dissenters, led by Justice Blackmun with strong sepa-
rate support from Justice O'Connor, contended that the Court
erred in providing an interpretation of the statute which, con-
trary to numerous precedents, failed to "avoid serious doubt of
[its] constitutionality. "92 Blackmun insisted:
[Tihe majority sidesteps this established canon of con-
struction with the feeble excuse that the challenged Reg-
ulations "do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful
constitutional questions,' . . . that would lead us to
assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issu-
ance." ...
This facile response to the intractable problem the
Court addresses today is disingenuous at best. Whether
or not one believes that these Regulations are valid, it
avoids reality to contend that they do not give rise to seri-
ous constitutional questions. The canon is applicable to
this case not because "it was likely that [the Regulation]
. . .would be challenged on constitutional grounds,"
ante, at 15, but because the question squarely presented
by the Regulations-the extent to which the Government
may attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the
receipt of a public benefit-implicates a troubled area of
our jurisprudence in which a court ought not entangle
itself unnecessarily.9"
B. The Free Speech Argument
There were two types of constitutional issues in question
in Rust, the First Amendment freedom of speech problem and
the Fifth Amendment claim that the regulations violated the
right to choose to terminate the pregnancy. The concern here
is with the Rust case as a First Amendment discussion and not
primarily with the right to abortion issue.
The argument, according to the Court, was in two parts.
First, Rehnquist responded to the claim that the
92. Id. at 1778 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1778-79. Justice O'Connor noted:
In this case, we need only tell the Secretary that his regulations are
not a reasonable interpretation of the statute; we need not tell
Congress that it cannot pass such legislation. If we rule solely on
statutory grounds, Congress retains the power to force the
constitutional question by legislating more explicitly. It may instead
choose to do nothing. That decision should be left to Congress; we
should not tell Congress what it cannot do before it has chosen to
do it.
Id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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regulations violate the First Amendment by impermissi-
bly discriminating based on viewpoint because they pro-
hibit "all discussion about abortion as a lawful option-
including counseling, referral, and the provision of neu-
tral and accurate information about ending a pregnancy-
while compelling the clinic or counselor to provide infor-
mation that promotes continuing a pregnancy to term." 94
Second, he reacted to the contention that the rights of both the
patients and the staff of recipient programs were violated
because the funding for their services was contingent upon an
unconstitutional condition, to wit, the waiver of their right to
freedom of speech.
Rehnquist began from the contention that the statute is
clearly constitutional under the Maher v. Roe line of cases in
that government plainly can prefer childbirth over abortion in
its policies. Therefore,
Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities
it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal
with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Gov-
ernment has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint;
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion
of the other.9 5
Under this approach, counselling is clearly regarded as action,
an "activity," rather than speech, and activities not consonant
with legislative policy may be prohibited. Hence, Rehnquist
wrote, "This is not a case of the Government 'suppressing a
dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its
employees from engaging in activities outside its scope."9 6
Rehnquist cited as an example of permissible policy the
following situation. "When Congress established a National
Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to
adopt democratic principles, 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b), it was not
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage com-
peting lines of political philosophy such as Communism and
Fascism." 97 This analogy is problematic. A more accurate
comparison would arise if, in implementing such a statute, the
government adopted rules prohibiting grant recipients from
discussing Communism or Fascism at all-even if someone
94. Id. at 1771-72.
95. Id. at 1772.
96. Id. at 1772-73.
97. Id. at 1773.
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asked a direct question about those ideologies. In that setting,
it is absurd to suggest that such regulations would not be bla-
tant violations of free speech "in their most pristine and classic
form."9 If allowed to survive, such rules would presumably
prohibit a study of the failures of those ideologies and the gov-
ernments shaped by them. Had such a program existed at the
time of the framing of the Constitution, the Founders and early
partisans would have been in serious trouble, given their ten-
dency to evaluate governmental institutions of the past so as to
learn from those institutions' successes and failures.
Rehnquist rejected the petitioners' use of Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland,"9 asserting that the statute in that case
fell because it "discriminated between magazines on the basis
of their content" and "target[ed] a small group within the
press" to be taxed.'0 He found neither of those problems in
the Title X regulations: "But we have here not the case of a
general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of
speech content, but a case of the Government refusing to fund
activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded
from the scope of the project funded."''
Suggesting that what was really at issue was a question of
discrimination rather than a claim to an independent right,
Rehnquist observed: "Petitioners' assertions ultimately boil
down to the position that if the government chooses to subsi-
dize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous counter-
part rights."' 1 2 Citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Washington,' 3 Maher v. Roe,' °4 and Harris v. McRae,'0 5 he
announced, "the Court has soundly rejected that proposi-
tion." 106 Of the three cases, only Regan was a First Amendment
case. Justice Blackmun pointed out that three justices in Regan
"joined the Court's opinion precisely '[b]ecause 26 U.S.C.
§ 501's discrimination between veterans' organizations and
charitable organizations is not based on the content of their
speech.' "7 The question with respect to the Title X regula-
98. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
99. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
100. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
104. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
105. 448 U.S. 297, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
106. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773.
107. Id. at 1780-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at
551).
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tions was not denial of status but prohibition of otherwise
existing rights.
The Court's opinion necessarily turned to the argument
about the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Rehnquist
provided two responses. The first was that what was really
involved here was a form of time, place, and manner regulation
in that only one portion of the recipient organization's activi-
ties was affected-that part funded by government. Therefore,
there were other avenues of expression available. The second
argument was that "the regulations do not significantly
impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship"' 0 ' because the
doctor is not required to say anything which he or she does not
believe and because the program does not "justify an expecta-
tion on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical
advice."' 0 9
The former argument is based upon the idea that so long
as the organization maintains a physical and financial separa-
tion between its grant-funded program and the rest of its oper-
ations, it is free to provide abortion information in the
nonfunded area. That does not change the fact that patients
coming into a clinic operated by a funded organization cannot
be provided with information regarding abortion, even if the
patient specifically asks for it. The clinic, under the rules, may
not tell a patient that she might wish to consult with the other,
nonfunded, portion of the organization for information. The
Court's response is circular. The Court held that because the
program receives government funds, it may not provide
requested information in its possession.
The Court's comment that the patient has no right to
expect comprehensive medical information would be amusing
were its consequences not so tragic. The issue was never
whether a patient was entitled to comprehensive information.
The question was whether the patient could be denied, and the
providers prohibited from presenting, answers to specific med-
ical questions directly relevant to pregnancy and family plan-
ning in a situation in which information was provided about
only one dimension of a possible medical choice. Even the dis-
senting Tenth Circuit Judge who held in favor of the rules rec-
ognized that there was plainly an interference in the doctor/
patient relationship in which the physician had some obliga-
tions. The majority in the Tenth Circuit clearly pointed out
that the obligations were not merely common law based but
108. Id. at 1776.
109. Id.
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also grounded in sets of professional codes which specifically
required disclosure of the information sought by patients.
Moreover, the lessons of both Thornburgh and Akron are plainly
contrary to Rust. If the Court wanted to make the claims
advanced in Rust, it should have explicitly limited or over-
turned those two rulings.
In the end, the Court found itself facing the inevitable. It
was either constrained to support a right/privilege dichotomy
or uphold the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. In the
end, it chose, without admitting the point, the former. Rehn-
quist wrote: "The employees' freedom of expression is limited
during the time that they actually work for the project; but this
limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employ-
ment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted
by the funding authority."'110 There is absolutely no distinction
between that conclusion and the repeatedly rejected assertion
that students, teachers, or other government employees can be
made to surrender their First Amendment freedoms as a condi-
tion of employment.
Nor is it adequate to argue that the focus is on the organi-
zation rather than the individual. 11' The effort by the Court to
differentiate FCC v. League of Women Voters 2 on that point was
singularly unpersuasive.
The defects in Rehnquist's opinion are manifold. The
Court began by confusing speech and conduct. Rehnquist
maintained that:
A doctor who wished to offer prenatal care to a project
patient who became pregnant could properly be prohib-
ited from doing so because such service is outside the
scope of the federally funded program. The regulations
prohibiting abortion counseling and referral are of the
same ilk .... This is not a case of the Government "sup-
pressing a dangerous idea," but of prohibition on a pro-
ject grantee or its employees from engaging in activities
outside of its scope."11
Actually, his statement is in error on both counts. First, control
over speech is not the control over the delivery of patient care.
The former is speech and the latter is action. At a minimum,
there is speech plus, the regulation of which requires a differ-
ent approach from that employed by the Court. Second, the
110. Id. at 1775.
111. Cf NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
112. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
113. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773.
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government could suppress the inappropriate conduct, the
"nonspeech element," without suppressing the speech."S4 The
only reason for controlling the speech is to control the idea.
If Rehnquist is correct, then it should be equally accepta-
ble to discriminate among Title X recipients on the basis of
their ideology or religion, since that would be another way of
protecting against 'inappropriate' behavior by recipients.
Their speech does not present adequate grounds to predict
inappropriate behavior any more than the fact that the clinician
is a Protestant as opposed to a Catholic.
The contention that there is no discrimination with respect
to abortion related speech is patently untrue in two respects.
First, as Judge Kearse pointed out in her Second Circuit opin-
ion, there is a clear bias against information about abortion.
The Tenth Circuit agreed and argued that it would have been
an entirely different matter had the regulations called upon the
clinic to say nothing more after the point at which it was deter-
mined that the woman was pregnant. The regulations did far
more in prohibiting even a response to a direct request for
information about abortion while simultaneously mandating
distribution of information concerning childbirth and prenatal
care. Second, the Court was simply in error in suggesting that
physicians were not required to advance a position in which
they did not believe. By compelling the physician to withhold
valid medical information regarding abortion and to affirma-
tively state that abortion is not an appropriate method of family
planning, there is a clear effort to coerce speech with a point of
view in the face of contrary personal beliefs and professional
responsibilities. The Court has held that freedom of thought
without freedom of speech is meaningless, and to compel the
public advocacy of positions not held by the clinician is plainly
unacceptable. "5
114. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The district
court addressed this question with respect to the AID "standard clause" but
the second circuit panel did not rely on the argument in its opinion. In the
district court the argument for interference with the speech element rested
upon the presence of the discretion accorded the government in matters of
foreign policy. This uncritical deference is characteristic of some of the
Court's opinions. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). However, it
flies in the face of a number of declarations that a talismanic invocation of
foreign policy or national security is insufficient to effectively waive the
protections of the first amendment. See, e.g., United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
115. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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When Rehnquist argued that failure to support abortion
did not mean content-based discrimination, he ignored the dif-
ference between no action by government and coercion not to
speak. As the lower courts recognized, this would be an
entirely different case if the communication was not barred.
There is a dangerous tendency in this opinion to set up a
false dichotomy between treatment of speech in the context of
funded action and speech otherwise protected by the First
Amendment. If Rehnquist's position were valid, it would be
permissible for government units which support abortion prov-
iders with state or local funds to prohibit anti-abortion discus-
sion or counseling by physicians in that jurisdiction. While the
earlier cases hold there is no obligation to advance a policy
with which the government disagrees, that is not a recognition
of the power to ban the discussion of the idea.
Rehnquist's response to the Pery v. Sindermann and FCC v.
League of Women Voters arguments is circular on the one hand
and disingenuous on the other. The attempt to distinguish
between the individual and organization in this case will not
withstand scrutiny. The speaker does not lose his or her First
Amendment protection because he or she is associated with an
organization.
First, the organization itself can assert First Amendment
claims in its own right and on behalf of its members." 6 Sec-
ond, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the rejec-
tion of the right/privilege dichotomy specifically stand for the
proposition that a public employee who works for an organiza-
tion, even if it is created by statute, does not lose the protection
of the First Amendment.' Third, the core of the First
Amendment argument is precisely that professional, complete,
conscientious performance of the duties of the grantee organi-
zation requires full disclosure by the employee of the grantee.
The Court plainly recognized that fact in the earlier Akron and
Thornburgh opinions.
The Court's contention that doctors can talk elsewhere is
not a satisfactory answer to the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. It begs the question. The cases involving schools
and civil service employment would all fall, if that were true,
since students, teachers, and civil servants could exercise their
116. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
117. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967).
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freedom of expression outside the school and during off duty
hours.
The approach taken by the Court eviscerates the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions and reimposes the right/privi-
lege dichotomy. The point is that government necessarily
operates under special limitations presented by the Constitu-
tion and not merely by the legislature. Congress may choose
not to fund clinics at all, but if it elects to fund the clinics, it
may not do so in a manner that violates the Constitution. The
logic which makes it possible to place words in the mouths of
physicians contrary to sound medical judgment and prohibit
presentation of valid information would just as easily justify
discrimination in government programs on the basis of race or
gender.
The Court contends that: "The grantee, which normally is
a health care organization, may receive funds from a variety of
sources for a variety of purposes."'118 The argument that it can
therefore speak of abortion with other funds in other places is
no answer. It merely says that when government pays it may
require waiver of otherwise protected liberty. The Court
should at least be forthright enough to admit this fact and not
pretend to maintain its longstanding position on the right/priv-
ilege dichotomy.
V. WHOSE INTERESTS COUNT? PROTECTION
FOR THE RECEIVER
The Rust opinion presents a speaker-versus-government
discussion that leaves serious damage in its wake for the con-
cept of the free flow of information under the First Amend-
ment. Consider the Rust opinion from the perspective of the
elements of the free flow framework.
A. The Independent Interests of the Receiver
The linchpin of the free flow theory is the idea that it is
meaningless to speak of freedom of expression if willing listen-
ers are prohibited by government from receiving the
message. 1 9 Viewed from the perspective of interests of the lis-
tener, the Rust opinion is devastating. It presents at least three
serious implications.
118. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774.
119. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); see also supra
text accompanying note 16.
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The obvious issue is that a willing listener who takes the
affirmative step of going to a funded family planning program
is specifically barred from hearing information that has been
available there for years and would be readily obtainable now
but for the government's prohibition. She may obtain informa-
tion about whether she is pregnant and how to bring that preg-
nancy to a full term delivery. She may not receive clinically
valid information about how to safely terminate the pregnancy
which is a decision she is, in most instances, legally entitled to
make.
Surely her interest in information about the abortion
option is at least as significant as that of the addressee of a pris-
oner's letter in the Procunier case or the senior citizens who
sought information on prescription drug prices in Virginia Board
of Pharmacy. That it might be possible to obtain the information
from some other source, as seen by a visit in the Procunier case
of the prisoner letter or by physically shopping from store to
store in the Virginia Board of Pharmacy situation, was not a factor
in the other decisions and should not be one here.
The second dangerous implication from this case is that so
long as one is poor enough, government may do through fund-
ing control what it could not do otherwise-prohibit access to
abortions. The fact that government is not obligated to fund
abortions does not authorize it to interfere in the process of
communication about the option. Government is not obligated
to print newspapers, but it is most assuredly precluded by the
First Amendment from abridging the freedom of the press. 12 °
It is not obligated to provide funding for a system of public
broadcasting but, having done so, it may not attempt to condi-
tion funding on a willingness to censor editorial decisions in
programming. 2 In addition, until the Rust ruling, although
government was not obligated to fund an abortion for a poor
woman, it was not permitted to coerce her-into not having one
by manipulating the messages she could receive from the clini-
cians to whom she went for medical advice.'
22
The other problem with the alternative source thesis is the
obvious defect noted by the First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, the
dissent by Judge Kearse in the Second Circuit, and in Justice
Blackmun's dissent. Women attend these funded clinics
120. Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
121. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
122. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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because they do not have ready access to alternative informa-
tion for the simple reason that they do not have the money.
The Rust decision does have a plainly discriminatory element to
it, but not just discrimination as to the content of communica-
tions. It discriminates in the exercise of First Amendment
rights on the basis of wealth. But for the poverty of the woman,
government would not be able to control the information she
receives. And given the fact that the Court does not suggest
that the permissible government preference for childbirth over
abortion rises to the level of a compelling interest, along with
its patent admission that the statute is not narrowly tailored to
the achievement of any other compelling interest, the provision
as applied by these regulations should fall.' 23 This contention
is not dependent upon the right to choose abortion as the basis
for the claim of discrimination. The discrimination is an
abridgement of speech.
Beyond the question of discrimination, the Rust decision
poses an additional free flow problem on purely practical
grounds. As the Tenth Circuit observed, in an era when states
are significantly modifying their abortion statutes and hospitals
are changing their policies, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a
person who lacks financial resources and perhaps education as
well to obtain the requisite information.' 24 And in that pro-
cess, time is of the essence, since the stage of pregnancy is both
a critical legal and medical element in the availability of
abortion.
The Court's opinion also ignores the fact that there is
more than one potential recipient of the information. The
spouse or significant other plainly has an interest in the infor-
mation and will be unable to assist the woman with her deci-
sion, to the degree that she wants that cooperation, if it is
withheld. Then there are family members who may wish to
provide support and assistance in the decision, again assuming
that the woman wants it. By prohibiting the communication of
abortion information, the government interferes not only with
the right of the patient as "addressee," but also with the rights
of her loved ones.
B. Protecting the Message
The Court attempts to use a device to avoid some of the
many infirmities of the regulations. This device is the dichot-
123. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
124. See Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1990).
THE RUST DECISION
omy drawn in the opinion between control over the grantee
organization and the freedom of the clinicians. In so doing,
however, the Court inadvertently highlights another free flow
flaw in its ruling. In First National Bank v. Bellotti,' 25 the Court
ruled that in the free flow theory of free expression, the
message is protected without regard to its source.' 26 Thus, the
Bellotti Court specifically rejected the argument that the fact
that the regulated entity was a bank made a difference and, at
the same time, refused to let the case turn on whether profit-
making corporate entities have a First Amendment right of free
speech. Instead, the Court determined that what was impor-
tant was the "stock of information" in the marketplace of ideas,
not the source from which that stock is derived.' 27 The fact
that the information might be available from some other source
in some other form had no bearing at all upon the First
Amendment protection available to the message. Similarly, the
Court's League of Women Voters opinion protected the editorial
discretion of the station despite the fact that it held a license
issued by the FCC and was funded by the federal government.
The criticism of Bellotti and Virginia Board turned largely on
whether the fact that the information was produced in an
attempt to make a profit affected the First Amendment status of
the expression. The Court rejected not only that conclusion
but the question itself. In Rust, not even that argument is pres-
ent since these are nonprofit organizations whose only interest
is in the presentation of information on the basis of which the
patient may make clinically sound decisions.
Indeed, in a very direct way, the government is permitted
by the Rust opinion to systematically seek to reduce the "stock
of information" by precluding dissemination of a set of ideas
by persons and organizations which seek to provide them. The
point is not merely that the regulations discriminate on the
basis of content, which they do, but that they seek to block
messages which are in themselves otherwise plainly protected.
The implications are profound indeed, for they suggest a
return to the days when free speech was made to turn on the
identity and character of the speaker as well as the intent with
which the ideas were communicated. 18
125. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
126. Id. at 783.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
128. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES (1941).
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C. Maintaining System Integrity: The Process of Communications
The "stock of information" discussion in the Court's free
flow rulings concerns the process of communication as well as
the protection of the content of the messages sought to be
communicated. The idea of free flow is itself associated with
the effort to "open the channels of communication."'' 29 The
Rust ruling damages that system of information flow in several
important ways.
Rust begins by removing a channel of communications that
had previously been accorded particular importance, that
between the physician and patient. In the Roe opinion itself,
the Court did not speak of the right to terminate a pregnancy
as some sort of abstract decision made by a patient apart from
other medical information and options. The Court spoke of
the decision to terminate, at least in the first trimester, as a
matter of "medical judgment" and personal choice. The com-
panion Doe v. Bolton 130 case focused on the doctor/patient rela-
tionship as central to the abortion decision and struck efforts
by the state to interfere in that decision process. That process
of consultation has been repeatedly protected by the Court up
to and including the Akron and Thornburgh cases.
The doctor/patient relationship is, however, not the only
communication process issue in the case. The interference in
the communication between an organization set up for the pur-
pose of conveying information to others is itself a plain inter-
ference with free flow. The only way that an organization can
comply with the regulations is by a decision not merely to
remain passively silent, but by a willingness to deliberately
withhold information in its position that the officers of the
organization believe responsible health care providers ought to
make available. The coercion acts to spark a kind of active self-
censorship. The message of the Court's rulings on vagueness
and overbreadth is precisely that government action which
breeds self-censorship is the most dangerous kind of abridge-
ment of freedom of expression.
VI. THE RISKS OF RUST
The Rust opinion is far more than an abortion decision. It
has wide ranging consequences. The opinion promises to have
profound implications for the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
129. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
130. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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ditions, the reimposition of the right/privilege dichotomy with
respect to government employees (either full time or through
grants or contracts), the speech/action distinction in First
Amendment issues, the distinction between regulation of pure
expression and speech plus action, and notions of access to
information as an aspect of First Amendment protected free-
dom of speech. All of these are quite apart from the obvious
issues associated with the right to privacy in general and the
decision to terminate a pregnancy in particular.'
3
1
But beyond its particular impacts, the Rust opinion seri-
ously undermines the entire idea that the First Amendment
131. Numerous articles discuss the abortion focused aspect of the right
to privacy. See Susan F. Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A
Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's Role in 'Private' Reproductive Decisions, 63
WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 236 (1985); Andrea Asaro,Judicial Portrayal of the Physician
in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51 (1983); Louise M. Benjamin, NBC, the Advisory Council,
and the American Birth Control League: A Study in the Definition of a Controversial
Issue of Public Importance, 28 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 70 (1990);Janet Benshoof, The
Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First
Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916 (1988); Paul H. Brietzke, Public Policy:
Contract, Abortion, and the CIA, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 741 (1984); Ruth Colker,
Abortion & Dialogue, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (1989); Charles R. DiSalvo, Abortion
and Consensus: The Futility of Speech, the Power of Disobedience, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 219 (1991); Theodore C. Hirt, Why the Government is Not Required to
Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895 (1988); C.
Andrew McCarthy, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling and Referral in Federally-
Funded Family Planning Clinics, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1181 (1989); Thomas P.
Monaghan, Sidewalk Counseling. A First Amendment Right, 31 CATH. LAw. 50
(1987); Edward G. Reitler, The Title X Family Planning Subsidies: The
Government's Role in Moral Issues, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 453 (1990); Susan H.
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615
(1991); G. Yanover, Fighting Fire With Fire: Rico and Anti-Abortion Activities, 12
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153 (1990); ThomasJ. Antonini, Note, First Amendment
Challenges to the Use of Mandatory Student Fees to Help Fund Student Abortions, 15
J.C. & U.L. 61 (1988); Margaret T. Brenner, Note, International Family
Planning, 8 Hous. J. Ir'L L. 155 (1985); Carole I. Chervin, Note, The Title X
Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41
STAN. L. REV. 401 (1989); Catherine Hebert, Note, Prohibition of Public Funding
for Abortion Counseling: Government Violation of Women's Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421 (1990); Mary Joan Loeffler, Note,
Silencing the Abortion Option: Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Bowen,
680 F. Supp. 1465, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 837 (1988); Michael Marcus, Note,
United States Foreign Population Assistance Programs: Antiabortion Propaganda?, 15
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 843 (1989); Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Note, Title X, The
Abortion Debate, and the First Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1737 (1990); Terry
Nicole Steinberg, Note, Abortion Counseling to Benefit Maternal Health, 15 AM.
J.L. & MED. 483 (1989); Nancy Lynn Walter, Note, Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers]: The Constitutionality of Conditions on Public Benefits in
California, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1475 (1982).
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protects more than narrowly defined rights of political speak-
ers-that it embraces a broader notion of the free flow of infor-
mation. More than that, by its rhetoric and tone it devalues
First Amendment currency. The Court should either take the
first opportunity to clarify the apparent discrepancies between
Rust and the free flow opinions or it should forthrightly reject
the free flow conception and explain the new framework for
First Amendment analysis. The Court has been rightly criti-
cized in the past two decades for weak attempts to differentiate
what are clearly contradictory precedents leaving a confused
body of law in its wake.' 32 The Rust opinion, not only leaves a
host of competing case law,' 33 but also leaves a framework that
seems completely out of step with the ruling. In so doing, the
Rust opinion is corrosive of a system of First Amendment law
that is essential to the nation and to the international percep-
tion of the United States as a bastion of liberty.
132. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 310 (1981) (Blackmun,J.,
concurring).
133. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
